Moynihan getting Republican Jesse Helms to collaborate), lawmakers passed a bill to prevent similar historical distortions.As Cohen and others pointed out, while Moscow was disgorging its scandalous Cold War secrets, Washington was taking a distinctly Soviet approach to its own history. By 1998, State's historians and the HAC had decided to produce a "retrospective" volume on the Iran coup that would help to correct the record.As mentioned, the CIA has begun to release documentation in recent years making explicit its connection to the Mosaddeq overthrow.Even earlier, by 2002, the State Department and CIA jointly began compiling an Iran retrospective volume.In the context of the disputed Iran volume, HAC members worried about the "random" nature of these provisions which gave the agency "a second bite at the apple." The implication is that the CIA will feel little obligation to help meet the HO's legal requirement if it believes its own "equities" are at stake.(This of course may still affect the Iran volume, currently scheduled for 2014 publication.) Is It the British?Agency officials said the document would address legitimate IC concerns; HAC members worried it would mainly boost CIA control over the series.The agency specifically held up action on four volumes to make its point, while HAC historians countered that the volumes were being "held hostage" and the HO was being forced to work "under the threat of 'blackmail'." The CIA held firm and an agreement emerged in May 2002 that, at least from available information, appears to bend over backwards to give the IC extraordinary safeguards without offering much reassurance about key HO interests.
Nematollah Nassiri, who attempted to serve Mosaddeq with a firman from the Shah, is directly behind the prime minister. The Foreign Office feared that a planned State Department publication would undermine U. standing in Iran, according to declassified records posted on the National Security Archive's Web site today. The declassified documents, from the Foreign Office (Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1968), shed light on a protracted controversy over crucial gaps in the State Department's authoritative (FRUS) series.(The National Security Archive obtained the documents through the U. Freedom of Information Act.) This suggests that ongoing CIA inflexibility over the FRUS volume is not so much a function of the agency's worries about its own role being exposed as a function of its desire to protect lingering British sensitivities about 1953 - especially regarding the activities of U. Regardless of the reasons for this continued secrecy, an unfortunate consequence of withholding these materials is to guarantee that American (and world) public understanding of this pivotal episode will remain distorted.Another effect is to keep the issue alive in the political arena, where it is regularly exploited by circles in Iran opposed to constructive ties with the United States. The reaction of the scholarly community and interested public was outrage.In the Fall of 2001, an ominous development for the HO gave a sense of where much of the power lay in its relationship with the CIA.According to notes of a public HAC meeting in October 2001, the CIA, on instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence, decided unilaterally "that there could be no new business" regarding FRUS until the two sides signed an MOU.